over- and/or underconfidence in nuclear command and control systems) and their impact on decision-making. These cases not only highlight the importance of leadership and human judgment but also provide insights into cognitive biases (i.e. Information sharing diminishes misperception and aids de-escalation. Lastly, the 1995 Norwegian rocket launch incident highlights the importance of information sharing and situational awareness in preventing misunderstandings, even in an amicable international security environment. Uncertainty and doubt are the domai n of System 2. Conscious doubt is not in the repertoire of System 1 it requires maintaining incompatible interpretations in mind at the same time, which demands mental effort. System 1 does not keep track of alternatives that it rejects, or even of the fact that there were alternatives. As Kahneman, a social psycho logist, put it: The interpretation that came to Petrov’s mind might have dominated the situation, and he may not have been aware of the uncertainty and ambiguity at play at that moment. Although Petrov trusted his intuition, guided by the experience that Soviet early-warning systems were patchy at the time, it is likely that he made a definitive choice without being consciously aware of it as he interpreted the data which suggested the presence of oncoming missiles. This action de-escalated a situation that could have led to the issuing of a preliminary command, which would in turn have unlocked the command and control chain to make it ready for a launch order from a decision-maker. Whereas Able Archer-83 provides insights into the misperceptions of chief decision-makers, especially in relation to the military exercises and training of forces that take place at times of elevated tensions, the 1983 nuclear false alarm incident captures the role as a decision-maker of a duty officer (Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov), who trusted his ‘gut feeling’ and decided to relay information about incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to higher echelons as a false alarm. On the other hand, the study of the 1995 Norwegian rocket launch incident allowed the researchers to judge whether – and to what extent – the degree of tension in the security environment matters, for instance in causing misperception, escalation or de-escalation. The authors have chosen these particular cases to analyse in further detail for the following reasons: they provide a comparison of the impact of the security environment in nuclear decision-making and they enable an understanding of the role of uncertainty and complexity under consistent secur ity conditions.īoth Able Archer-83 and the nuclear false alarm incident took place in 1983, providing an opportunity to compare two incidents where security concerns were similar, in a context of elevated security tensions. To illustrate uncertainty and complexity within the nuclear decision-making process, this section focuses on three case studies: the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident (also known as the Serpukhov-15 or Petrov incident), the Able Archer-83 exercise, and the 1995 Norwegian rocket launch incident (also known as the Blac k Brant scare). Previous cases of near nuclear use provide insights into the human judgment processes in decision-making, highlighting the role of uncertainty and complexity in determining the outcome of critical nuc lear decisions. The authors draw on past examples of near nuclear use to examine decision-making in the nuclear context as a wicked problem, with multi-layered, interacting and constantly fluctuating elements. At a time of crisis, these factors may combine to cause risks of escalation. This research paper presents nuclear weapons decision-making as a complex endeavour, with individual decisions being influenced by multiple factors such as reasoning, intuition (also referred to in the literature as ‘gut feeling’), biases and system-level noise. Tackling problems in the nuclear weapons policy field requires the implementation of ‘system of systems’ design principles, mathematical modelling approaches and multidisciplinary analysis. Nuclear decision-making is shaped by, and interacts with, the ever-changing international security environment and nuclear weapons policy. It could also play an important role in the nuclear weapons sphere – by opening alternative pathways that may help mitigate risks of confrontation and escalation – but such modelling has yet to be fully embraced by policymakers in this community.īy applying a complexity lens, policy- and decision-makers at all stages along the nuclear chain of command might better understand how their actions could have significant consequences for international security and peace. Complex systems modelling is already implemented in critical policy areas such as climate change and health.
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